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Over the last quarter-century presidents have appointed an increas-
ing number of czars to try to maintain some control over the burgeoning
administrative state. The increasing appointment of czars has inevitably
led to congressional concerns about the constitutionality of the practice.
Congressional indignation has been truly bipartisan, with both Demo-
cratic Senator Russ Feingold and Independent Senator Joe Lieberman
holding hearings on the issue and numerous Republican senators pub-
licly criticizing the practice. The nature of the term czar is loaded with
historical connotations and emotive implications that have done a disser-
vice to the academic analysis of the constitutional issues. Any meaning-
ful analysis must cut through the political and popular confusion and
focus on the Constitution and case law at the heart of the issue. As one
of the most problematic czars, the "Pay Czar," Kenneth Feinberg, pro-
vides a good case study for how to apply the appropriate analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
Late in the summer of 2009, a public uproar erupted over Anthony
Van Jones, an Obama administration official whom the media dubbed
Obama's "Green Jobs Czar."' The controversy arose over Van Jones'
* J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2011. Special thanks to Professors Jeffrey Rach-
linski, Josh Chafetz, and Thomas Mills for their advice and guidance on this Note.
1 Johanna Neuman, Czar Wars: After Axing Van Jones, Conservatives Sharpen Knives
in Hunt for More Obama Blood, L.A. THmms (Sept. 8, 2009, 11:26 AM), http://latimes-
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past advocacy for Marxist and Communist views and a YouTube video
of him calling Republicans "assholes." 2 Hardly the first politician to use
vulgar language towards his political opponents,3 Van Jones stood out
because of his radical political views.4 The final straw was the revelation
that he signed a petition claiming that the September 11th terrorist at-
tacks were an inside job perpetrated by the Bush Administration.5 He
resigned in the face of a public outcry demanding that Congress examine
the system that allowed the President to appoint him without any public
vetting, background check, or congressional confirmation. 6
Although the Van Jones incident was permeated by partisanship, it
highlighted a greater, nonpartisan, constitutional issue of whether the
growing presidential practice of appointing experts to influential posi-
tions within the executive branch without Senate confirmation violates
Section II, Clause 2 of the of the United States Constitution, commonly
known as the Appointments Clause.7 In addition, politicians, academics,
and commentators have raised practical policy concerns about the wis-
dom of using czars by asking whether or not they obscure the lines of
accountability and communication, threaten congressional oversight, and
usurp or undermine the statutory grants of responsibility to officers con-
firmed by the United States Senate.8
Although many, if not most, of the so-called czars are clearly oper-
ating with constitutional authority,9 there are several whose roles create
constitutional questions requiring further investigation and oversight by
Congress.' 0 Without this congressional action it is difficult to fully un-
derstand the role that many of these individuals play in implementing
executive branch policy. Part I of this Note explains the history behind
the emergence of czars within the American political system. Part II
discusses the policy reasons and concerns behind appointing czars. Part
III lays out the framework for an appointments clause analysis, and Part




3 John Dickerson, WTF Did Biden Just Say?: A Brief History of Bad Language in
Washington, SLATE (Mar. 23, 2010, 7:43 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2248689/.
4 Neuman, supra note 1.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 See U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 2; see also Letters from Senators Lamar Alexander,
Robert F. Bennett, Christopher S. Bond, Susan Collins, Mike Crapo, and Pat Roberts to Presi-
dent Barack Obama I (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://bennett.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.
Serve&Filejid=84531273-dOf2-4582-a540-182Oa9ba6fcO (expressing concern over the num-





Kenneth Feinberg under the Appointments Clause Jurisprudence. The
Note concludes by stating that, until courts forge clearer constitutional
boundaries for czars, their presence will likely perpetuate tensions be-
tween the legislative and executive branches of government.
I. THE AMERICAN ADOPTION OF RUSSIAN MONARCHS
The title "czar" has long been identified with powerful autocratic
rulers." It is a Slavic derivation of the Roman title "Caesar," and East-
ern European rulers first used the term to mean "Emperor."1 2 The title
has a long history in America as well,' 3 although its early use was pejo-
rative. The term's first documented use in American politics was in
1832 when supporters of President Andrew Jackson used the term to
publicly deride Nicholas Biddle, the President of the Second Bank of the
United States.14 One of those supporters was Washington Globe pub-
lisher Frank Blair, who called Biddle "Czar Nicholas" to incite compari-
sons with the tyrannical, contemporary Russian czar, Nicholas 1.15
Similarly, during the 1890s Democrats used the term to decry the strong-
armed political machinations of Republican Speaker of the House
Thomas Brackett Reed, and his powerful political successor, Joe
Cannon.16
However, after the fall of the Russian Monarchy in 1917, the title's
use evolved beyond its negative origins,17 and the media began to use the
term as shorthand for certain executive branch appointees.18 For exam-
ple, during World War I, President Woodrow Wilson named Bernard
Baruch to the head of the War Industries Board as the "Industrial Czar."
Like President Wilson before him, President Franklin Roosevelt named
several czars to aid his war effort.19 More recently, the term reemerged
in the American vernacular with the prominent appointments of William
E. Simon as "Energy Czar" by President Richard Nixon, and William
Bennett as "Drug Czar" under President George H.W. Bush, a position
"1 Ben Zimmer, Czar Wars: How Did a Term for Russian Royalty Work Its Way into
American Government?, SLATE (Dec. 29, 2008, 11:24 AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2207055.
12 See Tsar, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://encyclopedia.jrank.org/TOOTUMI
TSAR orCZAR.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2010); Tsar Definition, ONuINE ETYMOLOGY Dic-
TIONARY, http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=Tsar&searchmode=None (last visited
Sept. 19, 2010).
13 See Zimmer, supra note 11.
14 See id.
15 See id. (discussing the use of the term "czar" in American government).
16 See Zimmer, supra note 11.
17 See id. (discussing the way in which "kinder, and gentler 'czars' made their way into
American public life" after the fall of the last actual czar).
18 See id.
19 See Randy James, A Brief History of White House Czars, TIME, Sept. 23, 2009, http://
www.time.com/timelpolitics/article/0,8599,1925564,00.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2010).
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that exists to this day. 20 The appointment of czars grew during the
George W. Bush Administration and has arguably further increased dur-
ing the Obama Administration. 21
Since Frank Blair first introduced the title of czar to American polit-
ical discourse, the media has largely driven its use. 2 2 Though the conno-
tations associated with the word czar have evolved since the term's first
use in American politics, the word has consistently conveyed the idea
that the titleholder possesses nearly authoritarian control over his politi-
cal domain. 23 Despite the historical transformation in the term's conno-
tation from negative to positive, the term seems to have passed its apex
of popular approval, and has crashed quite precipitously in the current
political climate.24
II. WHY CZARS?
Although the controversy over czars is inevitably tinged with parti-
san rhetoric, the concerns are truly bipartisan and better characterized as
a struggle between the branches of the federal government rather than
between political parties. For example, one of the first politicians to ob-
ject to President Obama's appointments was the late Democratic Senator
Robert Byrd.25 Barely a month after Obama took office on February 23,
2009, Senator Byrd sent the President a letter expressing his concerns
about the use of czars in the new administration. 26 In his letter, Senator
Byrd expressed consternation about "the creation of new White House
Offices of Health Reform, Urban Affairs Policy, and Energy and Climate
Change Policy, and also about the appointment of White House staff to
coordinate executive branch efforts on technology and management per-
formance policies." 27 Senator Byrd also relayed specific concerns about
20 See id.; Zimmer, supra note 11. Neither Simon nor Bennett was actually the first to be
appointed to their positions. Rather, they were the first prominently appointed figures in each
position.
21 See Examining the History and Legality of Executive Branch Czars: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) [here-
inafter Czar Hearings] (testimony of Matthew Spalding, Director, B. Kenneth Simon Center
for American Studies, The Heritage Foundation); see also id. at 3 (testimony of Bradley H.
Patterson, Author, To SERVE THE PRESIDENT (2008)) (noting that czars do not have any legal
responsibility).
22 See id. (testimony of Bradley H. Patterson Jr.).
23 See Zimmer, supra note 11.
24 See, e.g., Eric Cantor, Obama's 32 Czars, WASH. PosT, July 30, 2009, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/29/AR200907290 26 24 .html; Letter
from Senator Robert C. Byrd to President Barack Obama (Feb. 23, 2009), available at http://
www.eenews.net/public/25/9865/features/documents/2009/02/25/document-gwO0 2 .pdf [here-
inafter Byrd Letter].
25 See Byrd Letter, supra note 28.
26 See id. at 1.
27 Id.
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the probable risk that such appointments would obscure lines of commu-
nication, responsibility, and authority between the White House and the
rest of the executive branch.28 Two days later, on February 25, 2009,
Senator Byrd's office publicized the letter via a press release and, thus,
openly criticized the President's appointments and announced his con-
cerns that the czars violate the Constitution.29
Senator Byrd specifically cited appointments made by the Nixon
and Bush Administrations that provide examples of the problems that
czars caused.30 He noted:
In the Nixon White House, Henry Kissinger directed for-
eign policy through the National Security Council as an
assistant to the President, and Peter Flanigan did the
same for economic policy through the newly established
Council on International Economic Policy. John Eh-
rlichman took responsibility for domestic policy through
a new Domestic Council.3 '
Byrd went on to complain about President Bush's appointment of
Tom Ridge as Director of Homeland Security by citing the Bush Admin-
istration's refusal to make Ridge available to Congress for questioning.32
Another example the Senator offered was Bush's 2007 appointment of
Lieutenant General Douglas Lute as Assistant to the President and Dep-
uty National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan.33 Byrd criti-
cized Lute's unavailability for Congressional questioning despite his
tremendous responsibility-coordinating two wars. 34 Byrd warned Pres-
ident Obama:
[T]he rapid and easy accumulation of power by White
House staff can threaten the Constitutional system of
checks and balances. At the worst, White House staff
have taken direction and control of programmatic areas
that are the statutory responsibility of Senate-confirmed
officials . . . . As presidential assistants and advisers,
these White House staffers are not accountable for their
actions to the Congress, to cabinet officials, and to virtu-
ally anyone but the president. They rarely testify before
28 See id.
29 Press Release, Senator Robert C. Byrd, Byrd Questions Obama Administration on
Role of White House "Czar" Positions (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://byrd.senate.gov/
2009_02_25_pr.pdf [hereinafter Byrd Press Release].
30 See Byrd Letter, supra note 24, at 1-2.
31 Id. at 1.
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congressional committees, and often shield the informa-
tion and decision-making process behind the assertion of
executive privilege. In too many instances, White House
staff have been allowed to inhibit openness and trans-
parency, and reduce accountability.35
Subsequently, in a letter to President Obama, six Republican sena-
tors echoed Byrd's objections. 36 These senators acknowledged that
many of the czars circulating on media lists were not problematic, but
they identified eighteen individuals that concerned them.37 Soon after,
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison expressed similar concerns in an op-ed
piece in the Washington Post.38 In October of 2009, the same concerns
led Democratic Senator Russ Feingold to hold a hearing on the constitu-
tionality of the various czar appointments.39 Independent Senator Joe
Lieberman also held a hearing on the presidential appointment of czars. 40
Ironically, the twenty-first century proliferation of czars is likely the
symptom of an executive branch struggling to cope with Congress's
complex twentieth-century legislative legacy, rather than an actual at-
tempt to increase executive branch power or obfuscate congressional
oversight.41 The development of the progressive movement in the twen-
tieth century ushered in an era of confidence in technical experts and
aspirations for an independent scientific administration, theoretically in-
dependent from political influences. 42 This faith in technocratic adminis-
tration also led to diminished skepticism towards politically
unaccountable bureaucrats regulating large segments of the American
economy. 43 As a result, Congress placed an increasing amount of power
35 Id.
36 See Alexander et al., supra note 7, at 1.
37 See id.
38 Kay Bailey Hutchison, Czarist Washington, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 2009, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/11I/AR2009091103504.html (last
visited Aug. 20, 2010).
39 See Kara Rowland, Feingold Hits Obama's Use of "Czars," WASH. TIMES, Oct. 7,
2009, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/oct/07/feingold-hits-obamas-use-of-czars/
?feat=Home_cubeposition3.
40 See Presidential Advice and Senate Consent: The Past, Present, and Future of Policy
Czars: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs, 111th
Cong. (2009).
41 See Cody M. Brown & Jeffrey D. Ratner, White House Czars: Is Congress to Blame?,
CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Oct. 19, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/
2009/1019/p09s04-coop.html.
42 See Czar Hearings, supra note 21 (testimony of Matthey Spalding) (discussing the
way the Progressive Era empowered intellectuals and politicians who sought to transfer policy
decisions to scientific and technological experts).
43 See id.
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in independent administrative agencies, which simultaneously shielded
the administrative state from political accountability.44
In an attempt to manage the growth of the administrative state cor-
responding with the progressive movement, Congress passed an act in
1932 that allowed the President to consolidate executive branch func-
tions and agencies in order to reduce expenditures, increase efficiency,
and eliminate duplication of effort.4 5 Over the next fifty years, presi-
dents submitted over one hundred similar reorganization plans to Con-
gress. 4 6 However, during the Reagan presidency, Congress failed to
reauthorize the Act, and since then, the President has had few tools to
manage the exponential growth of the federal government. 4 7
Czars give the President a method for reasserting control over the
massive administrative state by appointing an adviser who could coordi-
nate across different departments to spearhead the President's agenda re-
garding a particular policy issue.4 8 For example, Carol Browner, the
Energy and Climate Change Czar, is charged with coordinating the Presi-
dent's climate change agenda from the White House, even though the
issue involves the EPA, Department of Energy, Department of Transpor-
tation, NASA, and the State Department.4 9 Although Carol Browner
technically has no legal authority, she has significant power due to her
close proximity to the President.50
Another benefit that czars provide to the President is the appearance
of action.51 By appointing a czar, a President can send the message that
he is working to resolve a problem. 5 2 Czars have historically been touted
as experts tirelessly dedicated to a singular function and capable of cut-
ting through red tape or "knocking heads" together in order to achieve
the desired results.53 Consequently, czars can provide a good deal of
44 See id.
45 See Brown & Ratner, supra note 41.
46 See id.
47 See id. (discussing how absent a reorganization structure, the President has difficulty
consolidating and coordinating agencies).
48 See id.
49 See BARBARA L. SCHWEMLE ET AL., CONG. REs. SERV., THE DEBATE OVER SELECTED
PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANTS AND ADVISORS: APPOINTMENT, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND CONGRES-
SIONAL OVERSIGHT 19-20 (2009), OPEN CRS, available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/or-
ganization/132252.pdf.
50 See id. at 19 (quoting Carol Browner's statement that "[t]here is a difference between
being an assistant to the president and having a statutory responsibility as the Secretary of
Energy or the administrator of EPA."); see also Czar Hearings, supra note 21 (Testimony of
Bradley H. Patterson Jr.) (noting that czars do not have any legal responsibility).
51 See BRADLEY H. PATrERSON JR., THE WIrE HOUSE STAFF: INSIDE THE WEST WING
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value to a president, which has resulted in czars substantially populating
the executive branch of government. 54
III. WHAT MAKES AN AMERICAN CZAR?
A. Constitutional Underpinnings and Popular Confusion
As mentioned in Part I, the title of czar is an informal label fre-
quently used by the media to describe high level executive branch ap-
pointees tasked with coordinating part of the President's agenda."
Presidents have also occasionally used the term because it is an easy way
to convey that they were taking action to address problems.56 As an
informal title, the word itself is not constitutionally problematic, though
it can be quite unhelpful to informed political discourse because it lacks a
standardized definition and is often used emotively.57 In fact, both the
media and Presidents have largely confused the issue by using the term
to describe a wide range of officials with very dissimilar responsibilities,
statutory mandates, sources of authority, and methods of appointment.58
Use of the title czar is more the result of convenience or political market-
ing rather than accurate legal nomenclature.59 The term also appeals to
journalists because it easily substitutes for much longer official titles and
sounds catchy.60
Due to the lack of precision, it is impossible to say for sure how
many czars currently occupy Washington. 61 Media lists attempting to
count the czars in the current Administration fail to reach a consensus. 62
The counts vary, but several lists suggest there are around thirty czars. 63
The different counts are likely due to the lack of agreement on the defini-
tion of a czar. Consequently, the media and political pundits have seem-
54 See Rowland, supra note 39.
55 See Czar Hearings, supra note 22, at 1-4 (testimony of Bradley H. Patterson Jr.)
(discussing the history and legality of czars); see also Mike Doming, Barack Obama Adminis-
tration's Czars: How Many Are There? CHI. TRIB., June 14, 2009, http://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-talk-czarsjun 14,0,5035131 .story.
56 See BRADLEY H. PATTERSON JR., THE RING OF POWER: THE WHIE HOUSE STAFF AND
ITs EXPANDING ROLE IN GOVERNMENT 272 (1988).
57 See Czar Hearings, supra note 21, at 1-3 (testimony of Bradley H. Patterson Jr.).
58 See Czar Hearings, supra note 21, at 1-2 (testimony of Bradley H. Patterson Jr.)
(noting a disagreement with the media's use of an expansive definition of czars).
59 See id. (distinguishing the dictionary definition of czar with the author's definition).
60 See Posting of Ed to Senators Take on Czar Wars, N.Y. TIMEs CAUCUS BLOG, (Oct. 7,
2009, 11:22 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/07/senators-take-on-the-czar-
wars/.
61 See Czar Hearings, supra note 21 (testimony of Matthew Spalding).
62 Rowland, supra note 39.
63 See, e.g., Ed Homick, Jones' Resignation Puts Focus on Criticism of Obama's Czars,
CNNPoLrrics.com (Sept. 7, 2009 6:25 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/07/
obama.czars/index.html; List of Obama's Czars, supra, note59; President Obama's 'Czars,'
PoLrrIco (Sept. 8, 2009, 1:43 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0909/26779.html.
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ingly indiscriminately applied the title to a wide range of officials.64
Although critics can likely assert practical policy concerns regarding
many of the czars, the true constitutional questions only apply to a small
subset of the appointees.
The central constitutional concerns are whether the czars were prop-
erly appointed according to the Appointments Clause,65 and conversely,
whether the czars are acting beyond their constitutional authority, which
is limited by their method of appointment. Constitutionally, only "of-
ficers" are allowed to wield significant legal authority, and all officers
are subject to the Appointments Clause. 66 Thus, the key questions when
evaluating czars are: (1) What is the definition of an "officer," (2) do any
of the so-called czars fit that definition, and (3) if so, were they constitu-
tionally appointed?
Consequently, there are no constitutional issues when the President
appoints mere employees (as opposed to officers) without senate confir-
mation, or when the president appoints officers "with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate." 67 If, however, the president appoints principal
officers without Senate confirmation, or inferior officers without confir-
mation or legislative authorization, there are legitimate constitutional is-
sues. 6 8 The converse occurs when either the president or the head of an
executive branch department grants an employee authority that is consti-
tutionally entrusted to Officers of the United States. Therefore, when
courts decide whether an individual has been properly appointed, they
must decide whether he occupies an Office of the United States or is
simply an employee.
B. Who is an Officer?
Executive Branch appointments fall within two general categories:
"officers" and "employees." 69 The Supreme Court defined the distinc-
tion between these two groups almost thirty-five years ago: "'Officers of
the United States' does not include all employees of the United
States . . . . Employees are lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of
the United States."70 Officers are those who occupy an "office" of the
64 See id.
65 See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Czar Hearings, supra note 21 (statements by Sen.
Comyn and Sen. Feingold); Hutchison, supra note 38; Alexander et al., supra note 7, at 1;
Byrd Letter, supra note 24, at 2; Byrd Press Release, supra note 29.
66 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
67 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
68 See id.
69 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976).
70 See id. at 126 n.162 (citing Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890); United
States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1879)); Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U.S. 5, 7 (1880) ("In United
States v. Maurice, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall said: 'Although an office is an employment, it
does not follow that every employment is an office. A man may certainly be employed under
2010] 227
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United States.' Officers are further categorized as either principal of-
ficers or inferior officers.72 The Appointments Clause governs the ap-
pointment of officers:
[The President] . . . shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambas-
sadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United
States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but
the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.73
Thus, the Appointments Clause gives the President the authority to
appoint "Officers of the United States" to positions "which shall be es-
tablished by law . . . with the advice and consent of the Senate." 74
Therefore, not only do all officers require senate confirmation, but each
new office not provided for in the Constitution must be created by stat-
ute.75 However, within the Appointments Clause, the Excepting Clause,
as it is commonly known, provides that "Congress may by Law vest the
appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the Presi-
dent alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments." 7 6
Therefore, the default appointment process for inferior officers requires
Senate confirmation, although the framers provided a possible work-
around for the sake of administrative convenience.77 Inferior officers
can only avoid Senate confirmation if Congress previously established
their office and approved of their unilateral appointment.78 The Appoint-
ments Clause does not, however, govern the hiring or appointment of
mere employees. Title 3, § 105 of the United States Code authorizes and
governs appointment of employees (non-officers) to the White House
a contract, express or implied, to perform a service without becoming an officer."' (citation
omitted)).
71 See Buckley, 126 n.162.
72 See id. at 125 ("The Constitution for purposes of appointment very clearly divides all
its officers into two classes. . . . That all persons who can be said to hold an office under the
government . . . were intended to be included within one or the other of these modes of
appointment there can be but little doubt." (quoting United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508,
508-09, (1879))); see also U.S. CONsT., art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
73 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
74 Id. (emphasis added).
75 Id.; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 125-26.
76 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
77 See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 660 (1997).
78 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 125-26.
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staff.79 Other statutes allow for the hiring of employees throughout the
rest of the executive branch.80
In 2007, the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) issued a memorandum
on the meaning of "officer" as used in the Appointments Clause.8  The
OLC memo concluded that there are two necessary requirements for a
federal position to qualify as an office of the United States: (1) a delega-
tion of sovereign authority, and (2) continuing duties. 8 2 The first re-
quirement, and the historically defining characteristic of a public office,
is the office holder's legal responsibility to exercise sovereign authority,
including "making, executing, or administering the laws."8 3 The OLC
cited a leading nineteenth century treatise that defined an office as the
"right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law," to exercise "the
sovereign functions of the government . . . for the benefit of the pub-
lic." 84 Citing numerous eighteenth and other nineteenth century legal
authorities, the 2007 OLC Memo defined sovereign authority as the
"power lawfully conferred by the Government to bind third parties, or
the Government itself, for the public benefit."85 Sovereign authority also
includes other traditional executive functions including, but not limited
to, foreign negotiations, 8 6 the direction of military operations,87 the han-
dling and disbursement of public funds,88 and the right to contract on
behalf of the United States.89 Sovereign authority, however, does not
include the proprietary management of governmental property,90 or
"[p]urely ministerial and internal functions, such as building security,
mail operations, and physical plant maintenance, which neither affect the
79 3 U.S.C. § 105(a)(1); see also Czar Hearings, supra note 21, at 2 (testimony of Brad-
ley H. Patterson Jr.).
80 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 3101 (2008).
81 Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Asst. Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, Officers of the United States Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause,
(Apr. 16, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2007/appointmentsclausev10.pdf
[hereinafter Officers].
82 Id. at 1.
83 Id. at 8-9 (citing Opinion of the Justices, 3 Me. 481, 482 (Me. 1822)).
84 Id. at 10 (quoting FLOYD R. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES
AND OFFICERS § 1 1-2 (1890)).
85 Officers, supra note 81, at 12.
86 See id. at 15 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 486-87 (Alexander Hamilton)); see
also Logan Act, 1 Stat. 613, ch. 1 (1799), codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2000)
(making it a crime, absent the authority of the United States, for citizens to communicate with
foreign governments regarding international controversies or disputes).
87 See Officers, supra note 81, at 15 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 72, at 486-87 (Alexan-
der Hamilton)).
88 See Shelby v. Alcorn, 36 Miss. 273, 277 (Miss. 1858); In re Corliss, 11 R.I. 638, 640,
642 (R.I. 1876); Officers, supra note 81, at 15.
89 See United States v. Tingey, 30 U.S. 115, 126 (1831); United States v. Maurice, 26 F.
Cas. 1211, 1217 (C.C. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747); Officers, supra note 81, at 13-14.
90 See Opinion of the Justices, 3 Me. 481, 483 (Me. 1822).
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legal rights of third parties outside the Government nor involve the exer-
cise of significant policymaking authority."91
The Supreme Court offered a slightly different definition of what
constitutes an office in Buckley v. Valeo.92 In Buckley, the Court stated:
[T]he term 'Officers of the United States' as used in
Art[icle] II . . . is a term intended to have substantive
meaning. We think its fair import is that any appointee
exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of
the United States is an 'Officer of the United States,' and
must, therefore, be appointed in the manner prescribed
by § 2, cl. 2, of that Article. 93
Although the Supreme Court used the phrase "significant" rather
than "sovereign" authority, it gave no other indication that it was aban-
doning the historical definition.94 In fact, the Court discussed several
nineteenth century cases in the decision and reinforced the idea that it did
not intend to depart from the historical understanding of what constitutes
a public office. 95 Consequently, the phrase "significant authority" is best
understood as expressing the idea that exercising any "sovereign author-
ity" is a significant duty, rather than a measure of importance or conse-
quence. Importance alone, however, does not prevent an employee from
being an officer. In United States v. Hartwell,96 the Supreme Court de-
termined that a clerk working within the Treasury Department was in-
deed an officer of the United States because a department head had
appointed him to his position in accordance with the Appointments
Clause of the Constitution.97
According to the OLC, the second requirement that qualifies a posi-
tion as a public office is that the position must have "continuing" du-
ties.98 This second requirement, like that of exercising sovereign
authority, also has long historical roots. It is a requirement that dates
back to the case of U.S. v. Maurice,99 in which Chief Justice John Mar-
shall, while riding circuit, wrote:
91 Officers, supra note 81, at 10-11 (citing Constitutional Limits on "Contracting Out"
Department of Justice Functions under OMB Circular A-76, 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 94, 99
(1990)).
92 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976).
93 Id. (italics in original).
94 See Officers, supra note 81, at 10-11.
95 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 125 (citing Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310 (1890),
United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508 (1879)); Officers, supra note 81, at 10-11.
96 73 U.S. 385 (1823).
97 See id. at 393-94.
98 See Officers, supra note 81, at 23.
99 United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211, 1214 (C.C. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747).
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A man may certainly be employed under a contract, ex-
press or implied, to do an act, or perform a service, with-
out becoming an officer. But if a duty be a continuing
one, which is defined by rules prescribed by the govern-
ment, and not by contract, . . . it seems very difficult to
distinguish such a charge or employment from an office,
or the person who performs the duties from an officer.xoo
The Supreme Court later embraced and expounded upon this lan-
guage in United States v. Germaine.'0 In Germaine, the Court stated
that an office "embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and
duties, and that the latter [are] continuing and permanent, not occasional
or temporary." 0 2
Although the OLC concluded that the requirement of continuing du-
ties was indispensable to holding office, the consensus on this condition
is far from settled.103 One school of thought argues that continuity is
merely a factor to be weighed during analysis and that it is ultimately a
dispensable condition.104 This approach is evident in previous Attorney
General Opinions, 05 as well as both state' 0 6 and federal 07 precedent.
Moreover, it is arguably the approach that the majority adopted in one of
the mcst recent Supreme Court decisions regarding the Appointments
Clause, Morrison v. Olson. 08 In Morrison, the acting Assistant Attorney
General for the OLC, Theodore Olson,'0 9 challenged the constitutionality
of the appointment powers set forth in the Ethics in Government Act of
1978. That Act allowed' 10 for the appointment of an "independent coun-
sel" through the concerted action of the Attorney General and the Special
Division (a special court), in order to investigate and prosecute certain
100 Id.
101 99 U.S. 508 (1879).
102 Id. at 511-12 (citing United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1867)).
103 See Officers, supra note 98, at 30-31.
104 See id.
105 See id.
106 See id. (citing In re Corliss, 11 R.I. 638, 640, 642 (R.I. 1876)).
107 See id. ("[I]t was the uniform view of the federal courts in this period that a receiver of
an insolvent national bank, appointed (ultimately) by the Secretary of the Treasury, was an
officer for purposes of a statute authorizing certain suits in federal court by 'the United States
or any officer thereof."' (citing U.S. v. Weitzel, 246 U.S. 533, 541 (1918); Price v. Abbot, 17
F. 506, 507-08 (C.C. D. Mass. 1883); Frelinghuysen v. Baldwin, 12 F. 395, 396-97 (D.N.J.
1882); Stanton v. Wilkenson, 22 F. Cas. 1074, 1075 (S.D.N.Y. 1876); Platt v. Beach, 19 F.
Cas. 836, 840 (E.D.N.Y. 1868)).
108 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
109 Theodore Olson later served as the 42nd Solicitor General under George W. Bush
from 2001-2004.
110 Congress decided not to reauthorize the Independent Counsel Act, upon its expiration
in 1999. See RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALs 89 (5th
ed. 2006).
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high-ranking government officials for violation of federal criminal
laws.' The Act required the Attorney General to request that the Spe-
cial Division appoint independent counsel if, after a preliminary review
of information, the Attorney General has determined that there are "'rea-
sonable grounds to believe that further investigation or prosecution is
warranted."" 1 2 In considering Olson's constitutional challenge to the
legitimacy of the Special Division's appointment of independent counsel,
Alexia Morrison, the Court held that the independent counsel position
was an office of the United States, despite expressly acknowledging its
temporary and case-specific nature:
Nonetheless, the office of independent counsel is "tem-
porary" in the sense that an independent counsel is ap-
pointed essentially to accomplish a single task, and
when that task is over the office is terminated, either by
the counsel herself or by action of the Special Division.
Unlike other prosecutors, appellant has no ongoing re-
sponsibilities that extend beyond the accomplishment of
the mission that she was appointed for and authorized by
the Special Division to undertake." 3
Notably, the Court did not expressly consider the temporary and
specific nature of the independent counsel's duties as bearing on the
question of whether the independent counsel position was a public of-
fice." 4 Instead, the court treated the considerations as factors for decid-
ing whether the office was "superior" or "inferior." The Court held that
"the[ ] factors relating to the 'ideas of tenure, duration ... and duties' of
the independent counsel, are sufficient to establish that appellant is an
'inferior' officer in the constitutional sense."' '5 Consequently, the Court
upheld the constitutionality of the appointment. Although Morrison did
not explicitly address the requirement of continuing duties, the decision
is difficult to reconcile with the OLC's position that the requirement of
continuing duties is an indispensable condition of office.
The OLC concedes that the independent counsel position in Morri-
son was temporary; however, it argues that the position still fulfills the
requirement of continuing duties." 6 According to the OLC, the indepen-
dent counsel position included continuing duties for the following rea-
111 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 660.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 672 (italics added); see also id. at 671 n.12 ("It is clear that appellant is an
officer' of the United States, not an 'employee.'" (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126,
685 n.162 (1976)).
114 See id. at 671-73.
115 See id. at 672 (citing United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511 (1879)).
116 See Officers, supra note 81, at 34.
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sons: it was non-personal, non-transient, and indefinite-it terminated
only upon substantial completion of its duties. Notably, these duties
were "ongoing" and "not incidental."117 After the OLC's attempt to rec-
oncile the Morrison decision with earlier case law, the definition of con-
tinuing duties that emerges is very different than that which the Supreme
Court established in Germaine."8 In Germaine, the Court defined con-
tinuing duties to be those that are "permanent, not occasional or tempo-
rary."' 19 Synthesizing their definition from the Germaine and Morrison
decisions, the OLC determined that an office will qualify as having con-
tinuing duties although the position is temporary, if it is not "personal,
transient, or incidental." 1 2 0 The OLC thus succeeds in its literal synthe-
sis of the case law, but to do so it butchers the English language and
clouds the issues. The OLC explanation of the continuing requirement,
that an officer's duties can be temporary so long as they are not "per-
sonal, transient, or incidental" 121 swallows the continuing requirement.
It is simpler to merely exclude individuals whose duties are personal,
transient, or incidental, than to maintain a temporal requirement devoid
of any meaning. It makes little sense to cling to temporal terminology
when the Supreme Court implicitly disposed of any temporal conditions
in Morrison.122 This is not to say that the Supreme Court abandoned the
temporal language earlier courts had employed, but rather, that the con-
cepts can be better expressed through other language.
The departure from using temporal language is justified upon closer
inspection of the case law. A more careful look at Mauricel23-the sem-
inal case that introduced temporal language into the definition of an of-
fice-reveals that Chief Justice Marshall was distinguishing between two
competing sources of legal obligation rather than emphasizing the tem-
poral duration of the duties.12 4 The question was whether the duties were
personal in nature and arising under private contract or were statutorily
created public duties.125 Stated alternatively, the primary issue was
whether the duties continue regardless of who performs them, rather than
a temporal question of how long the duties would continue.126 A more
thorough reading of Maurice reveals the merits of drawing this
distinction:
117 Id.
118 See Gennaine, 99 U.S. at 511-12 (citing United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385,
393-94 (1867)).
119 Id.
120 See Officers, supra note 81, at 23.
121 See id.
122 See id.
123 United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas. 1211 (C.C. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747).
124 See id. at 1213.
125 See id.
126 See id. at 1213-15.
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A man may certainly be employed under a contract . . .
to do an act, or perform a service, without becoming an
officer. But if a duty be a continuing one, which is de-
fined by rules prescribed by the government, and not by
contract, which an individual is appointed by govern-
ment to perform, who enters on the duties appertaining
to his station, without any contract defining them, if
those duties continue, though the person be changed; it
seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or em-
ployment from an office, or the person who performs the
duties from an officer.127
Looking at the passage in context of the dispute at issue reinforces
this interpretation. The United States was suing James Maurice for fail-
ing to fulfill his duties as "agent for fortifications" of the United
States.128 The Court held that Maurice was liable for failing to fulfill his
duties as an agent for fortifications, which were legally prescribed duties
of a statutorily created office. 129
The distinction between duties arising under public law as opposed
to those arising under private contract was also evident in Hartwell.130
Yet the Court's infusion of unnecessary temporal language clouded the
issue:
An office is a public station, or employment, conferred
by the appointment of government. The term embraces
the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties.
The employment of the defendant was in the public ser-
vice of the United States. He was appointed pursuant to
law, and his compensation was fixed by law. Vacating
the office of his superior would not have affected the
tenure of his place.13' His duties were continuing and
permanent, not occasional or temporary. They were to be
such as his superior in office should prescribe.
127 Id. at 1215.
128 See id. at 1214-15.
129 See id. at 1216-17. The court found that Maurice was not an officer because he was
unlawfully appointed by the Secretary of War, without Congressional authorization. See id.
However, the court held that the position of agent of fortifications was a legally created office
and Maurice was contractually obligated to perform the duties assigned to that office, even if
he was not legally holding the office himself. See id.
130 See United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 393 (1823).
131 See id. Hartwell also expounded on the idea that an office should not be personal.
Although Maurice recognized that the existence of an office does not depend on the identity of
the office holder. See Maurice, 26 F. Cas. at 1214. Hartwell extended this idea, stating that an
officer occupies a position that will not be eliminated if his superior leaves office. See Hart-
well, 73 U.S. at 393.
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A government office is different from a government con-
tract. The latter from its nature is necessarily limited in
its duration and specific in its objects.13 2
Hartwell was charged with embezzling money under a statute
targeting public officers.'3 3 The Secretary of the Treasury had lawfully
appointed Hartwell as a Clerk for the Treasury Department in Boston, a
statutorily-created office. 134 This analysis alone was sufficient to dis-
pense with the decision, and the court's use of temporal language was
merely an attempt to differentiate a contractual obligation from a statu-
tory obligation.
Similarly, in United States v. Germaine,135 the Supreme Court used
temporal language as a tool for differentiating between contractual duties
and statutory duties. In Germaine the commissioner of pensions ap-
pointed the defendant under a statute that authorized the selection of sur-
geons to examine pensioners when legally necessary.' 36 The Court
concluded that the defendant surgeon did not occupy a federal office be-
cause his work was only "occasional and intermittent," given that the
surgeons were hired and paid independently for each individual examina-
tion.'37 The nature of the position was far more that of an independent
contractor than even an employee, and therefore any work done on be-
half of the government was a result of the individual contract rather than
any public duty.' 38
After Morrison,13 9 it is difficult to maintain that a federal office
must be indefinite, or have some specific temporal duration. The better
explanation of the temporal language in Germainel4 0 is that the duration
of the office is a factor that can aid in differentiating between duties that
arise from contract as opposed to statutory obligations. Upon synthesiz-
ing the case law discussed above, the best definition for a federal "of-
ficer" is someone vested with the duty of exercising sovereign authority
of the United States, for the benefit of the public, except where that duty
is only contractual, personal, or only occasional and intermittent.
C. Examining the Czars
Applying these legal principles to the issue of czars, it is possible to
separate them into four categories:
132 Id. (emphasis added).
133 See id. at 392.
I34 See id. at 392-94.
135 99 U.S. 508 (1878).
136 See id. at 508.
137 Id. at 511-12.
138 See id.
139 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
140 99 U.S. 508 (1878).
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1) officers confirmed by the Senate,
2) properly appointed inferior officers occupying offices created by
law,
3) employees operating as advisers to the president or his officers,
and
4) any other executive branch appointments who fail to fit into the
other three categories.
The first category includes appointees who have been confirmed by
the United States Senate in accordance with the Appointments Clause of
the U.S. Constitution. 141 These officials clearly present no constitutional
problems despite frequently being included on "lists" of czars. Their au-
thority is accurately characterized as being constitutionally derived. Fur-
thermore, they are subject to congressional oversight and, therefore, do
not represent any of the policy concerns expressed by Senator Byrd and
his congressional colleagues. As then-White House Communication Di-
rector Anita Dunn pointed out in defense of Obama's appointments, nine
of Glenn Beck's thirty-two listed Czars have been confirmed by the
Senate. 142
The second category of czars includes appointees the Constitution
classifies as inferior officers, who also present no inherent constitutional
problems. 143 Inferior officers are those who are appointed by the Presi-
dent, the judiciary, or the heads of Departments to offices statutorily cre-
ated by Congress,1 4 and they necessarily report to a principal officer for
supervision.145 Inferior officers, like principal officers, also possess con-
stitutional authority. Inferior officers occupy offices created by congres-
sional statute, are almost uniformly subject to congressional oversight,
and Congress can compel inferior officers to testify before it. 146
The third category of czars includes those appointees who are
neither inferior nor principal officers, but are most accurately categorized
as employees. 147 They serve as special advisers to the President, or to
principal or inferior officers.
The fourth category of czars includes those that may be serving un-
constitutionally. 148 These are the appointees who do not fit into any of
the previous three categories. Unfortunately, it is very difficult for the
public to determine exactly which czars fit into which category because
141 See discussion supra note 86 and accompanying text.
142 See id.
143 See discussion supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
144 U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl 2.
145 See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1997).
146 See ScHwEMLE ET AL., supra note 50, at 50-51.
147 See supra Part III.
148 See discussion infra.
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of the nature of some of their appointments. 149 When appointees do not
occupy statutory positions, are unconfirmed, and claim simply to be
Presidential advisers, it is much more difficult to determine their precise
job descriptions than it would be for someone occupying a position cre-
ated by Congress. Whereas the duties, responsibilities, and authority of a
statutorily created position are publicly available, it is not necessarily
clear where one would even begin to look when trying to determine the
responsibilities and authorities of a position that a president simply an-
nounced via press release.150 This is especially true given that adminis-
trations often have failed to sufficiently explain the scope of
responsibility given to so-called czars.
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH THE PAY CZAR
The czar who raises the clearest constitutional problems is Kenneth
Feinberg, the Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation, infor-
mally known as the "Pay Czar."15 1 Feinberg's responsibilities involve
interpreting the TARP regulations on executive compensation standards
and reviewing and approving the pay for top executives at the largest
institutions that the government provided with TARP funding. 152 In Oc-
tober of 2009, he invoked this authority to slash compensation for execu-
tives at seven large financial firms by an average of fifty percent.15 3
Michael W. McConnell, a Stanford Law Professor and former Judge
for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, recently penned an
op-ed in the Wall Street Journal challenging the constitutionality of Fein-
berg's appointment. 1 54 His article prompted a lively debate on the con-
troversy, which was hosted by the Federalist Society's website.155
McConnell argues that the nature of Feinberg's duties likely classifies
149 See supra notes 62 and 63 and accompanying text.
150 Compare 21 U.S.C. § 1703 (creating the office of and describing the duties of the
Director of National Drug Control Policy, as well as, several deputy directors), with Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Energy, President-Elect Obama Nominates Dr. Steven Chu as Energy
Secretary (Dec. 17, 2008), available at http://appsl.eere.energy.gov/news/news-detail.cfm/
newsid=12144 (announcing the appointment of Carol Browner as the "Assistant to the Presi-
dent for Energy and Climate Change").
151 See Michael W. McConnell, The Pay Czar Is Unconstitutional, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703574604574499953992328762.htm
[hereinafter McConnell, Unconstitutional]; SCHWEMLE ET AL., supra note 49, at 34-36. Per-
haps not coincidentally, Feinberg is really the only czar whose duties the Administration has
provided much detailed information about. Possibly this is because most so-called czars are
really glorified aids with no significant authority to make public.
152 See TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg.
28,394 (June 15, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 30).
153 McConnell, Unconstitutional, supra note 151.
154 See id.
155 See The Pay Czar & the Appointments Clause-a Forum, FEDERALIST Soc'v ONLINE
DEBATE SERIES (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.fed-soc.org/debates/dbtid.36/default.asp.
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him as an inferior officer, but that the Senate has not confirmed him.156
Professor Steven Schwinn counters that because Feinberg is an inferior
officer the Constitution allows for the head of a department, in this case
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, to appoint him.157 McConnell re-
sponds that the Secretary must be authorized by statute to appoint an
inferior officer without Senate confirmation, and although the TARP leg-
islation vested the Treasury Secretary with the authority to regulate and
set executive compensation for certain institutions, it did not authorize
him to delegate that authority to anyone who was not confirmed by the
Senate.158 In rebuttal, Schwinn points to 31 U.S.C. § 321(b)(2), which
states that "[t]he Secretary may . . . delegate duties and powers of the
Secretary to another officer or employee of the Department of the Trea-
sury."l 59 Schwinn also raises the possibility that because Feinberg's po-
sition is theoretically temporary, he might merely be an employee.' 60
Judge McConnell is likely right that Feinberg's appointment is un-
constitutional. 16 However, because the judge did not exhaustively ad-
dress Schwinn's arguments, this Note will take the opportunity to
expound on the author's view on the proper appointment class analysis.
Given the case law it seems clear that Feinberg is exercising sover-
eign authority by setting executive compensation. According to the
Treasury Department, the TARP legislation authorized Geithner to estab-
lish the office of Special Master and delegate quasi-judicial and execu-
tive powers to the office.162 As a result of this delegation, Feinberg is
authorized to exercise quasi-judicial functions by deciding private indi-
vidual rights, on a case-by-case basis, and he is also authorized to exer-
cise executive functions by interpreting the statute and issuing advisory
opinion letters.163 Furthermore, Feinberg has been given independent
discretion that is not directly subject to review by either the White House
or the Treasury Secretary.164
156 See Posting of Michael McConnell to The Pay Czar & the Appointments Clause-a
Forum, FEDERALIST Soc'y ONLINE DEBATE SERIES (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.fed-soc.org/
debates/dbtid.36/default.asp [hereinafter McConnell, Federalist Society Posting].
157 See Posting of Steven Schwinn to The Pay Czar & the Appointments Clause-a Fo-
rum, FEDERALIST Soc'Y ONUNE DEBATE SERIES (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.fed-soc.org/de-
bates/dbtid.36/default.asp [hereinafter Schwinn, Federalist Society Posting].
158 See McConnell, Federalist Society Posting, supra note 157.
159 See Schwinn Federalist Society Posting, supra note 163.
160 See id.; Steven Schwinn, Is the Pay Constitutional, CONsT. L. PROF BLOG (Nov. 20,
2009), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2009/week47/index.html [hereinafter
Schwinn, Constitutional Pay].
161 See discussion infra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
162 See TARP Standards for Compensation and Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg.
28,394 (June 15, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 30).
163 See id.
164 See Eamon Javers, Feinberg Touts His Special Mastery, PoLrnco, Oct. 23, 2009,
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1009/28635.html.
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Because Feinberg is exercising this sovereign authority pursuant to
statute, he is acting as an officer of the United States. Feinberg is clearly
not operating as a mere employee because the authority he is exercising
is significant, arises from statutory duty, and is not contractual, personal,
occasional, or intermittent. Although Schwinn raised the possibility that
the duties were temporary and therefore not continuing, this argument
fails for two reasons. First, as detailed above, the Supreme Court's occa-
sional use of temporal language is misleading.1 65  Second, Morrison
demonstrated that either the condition of continuing duties is dispensa-
ble, or that temporary1 66 duties are consistent with the meaning of
continuing.' 6 7
If Feinberg is operating as an officer of the United States, his ap-
pointment is subject to the Appointments Clause. Under the Appoint-
ments Clause, officers must be confirmed by the Senate unless Congress
has authorized the President, Courts of Law, or the Heads of Depart-
ments to appoint an officer without confirmation.16 8 Professor Schwinn
argues that a longstanding general-background organizational statute, 31
U.S.C.A. § 321, combined with the TARP legislation, authorizes the
Treasury Secretary to appoint Feinberg and delegate all relevant TARP
authority to him.' 69 To further support his argument, Schwinn cites two
circuit court decisions' 70 that upheld the creation of boards and the ap-
pointment of inferior officers to them, under general statutory grants of
authority similar to that at issue in the TARP "Pay Czar" case.' 7 '
However, Schwinn's argument is inconsistent with case law and the
Constitution because it fails to distinguish between authorization to ap-
point an officer and authorization to create offices. As stated previously,
arguments for the contrary position abound. The Supreme Court has
ranked the Appointments Clause "among the significant structural safe-
165 See discussion supra Part IH.B.
166 In Morrison, the office was "'temporary' in the sense that an independent counsel is
appointed essentially to accomplish a single task, and when that task is over the office is
terminated, either by the counsel herself or by action of the Special Division." Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 672 (1988). The court went on stating that "[u]nlike other prosecutors,
appellant ha[d] no ongoing responsibilities that extend[ed] beyond the accomplishment of the
mission that she was appointed for and authorized by the Special Division to undertake." Id.
Similarly, the Office of Special Master is indefinite in tenure until all of the TARP money is
paid back, at which time the office will cease. See TARP Standards for Compensation and
Corporate Governance, 74 Fed. Reg. 28,394 (June 15, 2009) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt.
30).
167 See id.
168 U.S. CONsr. art. H, § 2, cl 2.
169 See Schwinn, Federalist Society Posting, supra note 157.
170 Willy v. Admin. Review Bd., 423 F.3d 483 (5th Cir. 2005); Pennsylvania v. U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 80 F.3d 796 (3d Cir. 1996).
171 See Schwinn, Federalist Society Posting, supra note 157.
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guards of the constitutional scheme"l 72 because it protects the separation
of powers. 173 The White House Office of Legal Counsel corroborates
this view: "[T]hat the Constitution distinguishes between the creation of
an office and appointment thereto for the generality of national offices
has never been questioned." 17 4 Furthermore, the Congressional Research
Service has noted that "it is clear that the Framers intended to vest the
task of creating the governmental structure in Congress alone. Thus, it
seems evident that the President cannot establish executive offices."175
Finally, in Maurice, Chief Justice Marshall rejected the idea that the
president could create offices, stating that "the general spirit of the con-
stitution ... seems to have arranged the creation of office among legisla-
tive powers."176
Given the nature of his duties, Feinberg is likely an inferior officer.
However, he is occupying a position created by the Secretary, a function
reserved for the legislature. Although Congress can vest the authority to
appoint an officer without Senate confirmation in the heads of the depart-
ments, it cannot similarly delegate the creation of offices. As a purely
legislative function, the creation of offices should be restricted to Con-
gress under the non-delegation doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Over the past quarter-century, presidents have appointed an increas-
ing number of czars to try to maintain some control over the burgeoning
administrative state. The increasing appointment of czars has inevitably
led to congressional concerns about the constitutionality of the practice.
However, because of the very nature of the appointments, it is difficult to
172 Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997). Thus, the proper appointment of
executive branch officials is no mere a formality. See id. at 659; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
124 (1976) ('The Appointments Clause could, of course, be read as merely dealing with eti-
quette or protocol in describing 'Officers of the United States,' but the drafters had a less
frivolous purpose in mind."). Consequently, in Appointments Clause challenges, the Supreme
Court has chosen formalism over functionalism by rejecting the "de facto officer doctrine."
See Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 183 (1995); Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530,
536 (1962) (saying that the de facto officer doctrine does not apply where the defect is based
on important constitutional challenges). This doctrine validates acts conducted under the color
of official authority, even if it is later proven that actor's appointment or election to office was
deficient. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 180. The Court's unwillingness to apply the de facto officer
doctrine to Appointments Clause challenges jeopardizes the validity of any actions or deci-
sions made by improper appointees.
173 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 124.
174 Limitations on Presidential Power to Create a New Executive Branch Entity to Re-
ceive and Administer Funds Under Foreign Aid Legislation, 9 Op. O.L.C. 76, 77 (1985) (em-
phasis added).
175 ScHwELLE Br AL.., supra note 49, at 40 (citing Saikrishna B. Prakash, Fragmented
Features of the Constitution's Unitary Executive, 45 Willamette L. Rev. 701, 719 (2009)).
176 United States v. Maurice, 26 F. Cas 1211, 1213 (C.C. Va. 1823) (No. 15,747) (empha-
sis added).
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really establish the true scope of a czar's authority and duties. The same
vagueness of a czar's mandate that so angers Congress will also frustrate
Congress' attempts at oversight. Until Congress makes a substantial at-
tempt to overhaul the administrative state, czars will be a part of it, re-
gardless of what name they go by.

